Case No. CR-1208084

Dept. No.🖔 2



THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WHITE PINE

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THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

MIKE FIXER NEWCASTLE,

Defendant.

AMENDED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON JURY MISCONDUCT AND CONFLICTING EVIDENCE<sup>1</sup>

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 18, 2013, after a four day trial by jury, a verdict of guilty for the crime of battery by an inmate with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm was rendered against the defendant, MIKE FIXER NEWCASTLE ("Mr. Newcastle").

Testimony in the record showed that the victim sustained critical life threatening injuries as a result of the battery sustained.

During trial, the state's main witness, Ely State Prison Correctional Officer

Cortney Green, testified that he saw Mr. Newcastle standing over the victim with the weapon raised over his head in a striking fashion. Evidence also showed that Mr.

Green's testimony changed several times during the course of the investigation,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Amended to correct a factual error in original motion fn21.

<sup>2</sup> As a result of a very late disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence, the parties stipulated to a jury instruction that Mr. Green's testimony was to be mistrusted. However, the Court only permitted the introduction of Mr. Green's preliminary testimony transcript as evidence of the changes to his testimony. In addition, on the record, the Court considered striking Mr. Green's testimony in its entirety.

preliminary hearing and trial.<sup>2</sup> In addition, there was testimony that Mr. Green was "rattled" and in a state of shock during and immediately after observing the victim's injuries. Defense counsel argued that Mr. Green's testimony should be mistrusted pursuant to the jury instructions because of how inconsistent it had been throughout the case. In addition, defense counsel argued Mr. Green's emotional state could have affected his perception and memory of the events and that Mr. Green was testifying to what he thinks he saw instead of what he actually saw.

The State's DNA expert, Monica Siewertsen, testified that DNA found on the weapon matched the victim and second or third trace contributors who could not be identified. Ms. Siewertsen also testified that the method she used to collect DNA from the weapon destroyed any possibility of lifting fingerprints from its surface. Finally, Ms. Siewertsen testified that the DNA found on Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit and on his shoe matched the DNA of the victim.

Defense expert, Jeff Saviano, testified that he examined the blood splatter found in the room and on Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit. After examining the directionality and the placement of the blood splatter, Mr. Saviano explained that the splatter on the front of the jumpsuit was deposited onto the article when Mr. Newcastle was facing the source of the splatter. He further explained that the size, location and directionality of the splatter on the rear of the jumpsuit showed that Mr. Newcastle must have had his back turned to the source of the splatter. In conclusion, Mr. Saviano proffered the opinion

that Mr. Newcastle could not have been the perpetrator who struck the blow which deposited splatter onto the rear portion of his jumpsuit.

The jury could have returned three possible verdicts in this case. First, that Mr. Newcastle was guilty of attempted murder; second, that Mr. Newcastle was not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of battery by an inmate with a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm; and third, that Mr. Newcastle was not guilty. The jury spent approximately two to three hours deliberating before returning with its verdict. After the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel had the opportunity to discuss the case with several jurors.

Juror Josie Jensen ("Ms. Jensen") told defense counsel that a couple of jurors voiced a belief that that Mr. Newcastle was guilty of attempted murder. In addition, Ms. Jensen indicated that there were jurors who voiced that the evidence was insufficient to show that Mr. Newcastle attempted to murder the victim. Finally, Ms. Jensen indicated that during deliberations at least one or two other jurors voiced doubt about Mr. Newcastle's guilt and that after deliberations, the jury compromised on a verdict of guilty to the alternate charge.

Juror James Nelson ("Mr. Nelson") told defense counsel that during deliberations he declared that Mr. Newcastle was in prison for a reason; clearly suggesting that Mr. Newcastle was guilty simply because he was incarcerated. Juror Amanda Reieher ("Ms. Reieher") told defense counsel that during deliberations, jurors discussed Ely State Prison, the fact that Mr. Newcastle was in the room at the time of the battery and that they "knew he was involved with the battery somehow."

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Juror Kelly Ernest ("Mr. Ernest") told defense counsel that during deliberations, jurors commented on the fact that Mr. Newcastle was an inmate at Ely State Prison and that jurors stated that everyone knows that the inmates are at Ely State Prison, in particular, for a reason. In addition, Mr. Ernest told defense counsel that the jury discussed convicting Mr. Newcastle because they knew he was involved in the offense in some way because he had the victim's blood on his jumpsuit. Mr. Ernest further stated that the jury opined that he may have been in the room to assist the individual who was actually delivering the blows to the victim.

## <u>DISCUSSION</u>

### A. Motion for a New Trial

#### 1. Juror Misconduct

A criminal defendant must file a motion for a new trial (for reasons other than those specifically enumerated in N.R.S. §176.515(1)) within seven days after a verdict or finding of guilt.<sup>3</sup> Jury misconduct may be grounds to grant a new trial; however, "Not every incidence of juror misconduct requires the granting of a motion for [a] new trial"

"Juror misconduct falls into two categories: (1) conduct by jurors contrary to their instructions or oaths, and (2) attempts by third parties to influence the jury process." The first category includes considering information not admitted during the trial, instances of jurors specifically ignoring the law as instructed to them by the court, and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> N.R.S. § 176.515(4) (2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> || <sup>4</sup> Barker v. State, 95 Nev. 309, 313, 594 P.2d 719, 721 (1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> <u>Meyer v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 554, 561, 80 P.3d, 447, 453 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).

lying or concealing information during voir dire examination.<sup>6</sup> The second category is not alleged and will not be discussed here.

To determine if a new trial is warranted, the Court must conduct a very factintensive analysis, considering the nature and the extent of any misconduct and the
pervasiveness of any prejudice possibly resulting.<sup>7</sup> The Court may only consider
objective evidence based upon overt conduct and may not delve into the deliberative
thought process of the jury at any time.<sup>8</sup> Whether or not intrinsic jury misconduct
occurred and the extent of any resulting prejudice are questions of fact to be determined
by the district court. Such findings will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.<sup>9</sup>
Whether or not the jury considered extraneous evidence is an issue which implicates
the confrontation clause and is, therefore, reviewed de novo.<sup>10</sup>

Evidence obtained from a juror regarding deliberations is only admissible if it can be established through objective facts and overt conduct without regard to the state of mind and the mental processes of any one juror. Objective facts can include those things which are readily observable, including specific statements made by jurors. 12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> <u>ld</u>.

<sup>|| &</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> <u>|d</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> <u>Id.</u>, at 562, 80 P.3d at 453 (interpreting N.R.S. § 50.065(2)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Walker v. State, 95 Nev. 321, 323, 594 P.2d 710, 711 (1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Meyer, at 567, 89 P.3d at 457.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> <u>Id</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> <u>Id</u>. The court allowed actual statements made aloud by the jurors during deliberations. However, the Court struck any statements made by jurors which addressed the impact or effect those statements had on the mental processes or decision making of the jurors.

A defendant has the burden of proving that misconduct occurred and that the misconduct was prejudicial. 13 "To justify a new trial, the defendant must, through admissible evidence, demonstrate the nature of the misconduct and that there is a reasonable probability that it affected the verdict." 14 When determining whether or not misconduct affected the verdict, the Court must consider: 15 the timing of the misconduct; the materiality of the issue; the possible admissibility of any extrinsic evidence considered including the background of the parties, prior bad acts, crimes not charged; the influence the misconduct might have had in light of the entire trial; 16 how long the jury discussed the extrinsic material; when the discussion occurred in relation to the verdict; the specificity or the ambiguity of the information; 17 whether the issue of guilt or innocence is close; the quantity and character of the error; and the gravity of the crime charged." 18

## a. Failure to Follow the Instructions of the Court

It is the duty of a juror to fully and completely follow the instructions given to him by the district court and any failure to do so is juror misconduct.<sup>19</sup> Where it is shown that a jury failed to follow its instructions, a new trial must be granted unless it is clear,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Maestas v. State, 128 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 275 P.3d 74, 84, (2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> <u>Zana v. State</u>, 125 Nev. 541, 547, 216 P.3d 244, 248, (2009) (internal quotations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Not an exhaustive list.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1186-87, 196 P.3d 465, 475 (2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> <u>Zana</u>, at 541, 216 P.3d at 248.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> <u>Id.</u>, (citing <u>Big Pond v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Valdez, at 1187, 196 P.3d at 475 (2008).

beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice resulted.<sup>20</sup> The burden is on the defendant to prove that the jury misconduct occurred and that there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the verdict.<sup>21</sup>

In the case at hand, there is an abundance of objective evidence showing that the jury failed to follow this court's instructions. Juror Nelson blatantly admitted to defense counsel that he introduced into deliberations conversation regarding Mr. Newcastle's present placement at Ely State Prison. In addition, Jurors Ernest and Reieher indicated that thorough discussions took place during deliberations concerning Mr. Newcastle's incarceration and the character of inmates at Ely State Prison (i.e. the propensity of those who are at Ely State Prison to commit violent offenses.) Juror Jensen's statements provide objective evidence that the issue of guilt or innocence was close and that the conviction was not the result of overwhelming evidence.

In this case, Mr. Newcastle was clearly prejudiced when the jury considered his present incarceration. The objective evidence demonstrates that the jury was or could have been influenced by their discussion of and consideration of the fact that Mr. Newcastle is incarcerated, not only in the Nevada Department of Corrections, but in Ely State Prison in particular. In this instance, the prejudice which resulted is the clear implication a reasonable juror could make that because inmates are housed at Ely State Prison, they are inherently violent, and therefore are guilty of any violent crime with which they are charged.

In this case, the parties involved attempted to ensure that Mr. Newcastle was on trial for the crime he was charged with, instead of being tried and punished again for

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<sup>23 || &</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> <u>Id</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> <u>ld</u>.

that crime which he was previously convicted.<sup>22</sup> The Constitution guarantees that Mr. Newcastle be given a fair trial and that he be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The evidence is, however, that the jury in this case, presumed him guilty because he is incarcerated for another crime.

#### b. Extrinsic Evidence

# i. Consideration of a crime not charged

Here, the jury substituted elements into the court's instructions in order to convict Mr. Newcastle of this offense. In essence, they convicted Mr. Newcastle simply for being in the room because they "knew he must have been involved somehow."

When misconduct involves the introduction of extrinsic evidence including the consideration of a crime not charged, the confrontation clause is implicated.<sup>23</sup> If a juror has independent knowledge of any issue involved with the trial, communicating that knowledge to other jurors introduces extrinsic evidence and is misconduct.<sup>24</sup> "Likewise, if a juror considers and communicates a past personal experience that introduces totally new information about a fact not found in the record or the evidence, this would constitute extrinsic evidence and improper conduct."<sup>25</sup> A juror may express an opinion or interpret evidence based upon his own life experiences, but may not introduce facts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For instance, Mr. Newcastle was allowed to wear his own clothing. In addition, Mr. Newcastle was escorted to and from the Courtroom outside of the presence of the jury. Finally, Mr. Newcastle arrived at the Courthouse at least an hour before jurors were scheduled to arrive in order to change from his orange jumpsuit and restraints into his personal clothing to lower the chance that a juror might see him restrained.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Meyer, at 572, 80 P.3d at 460.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> <u>Id</u>. at 568, 80 P.3d at 458.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> <u>ld</u>.

essential to the case, which are not in evidence.<sup>26</sup> "The unsworn testimony of a juror as to a fact which is relevant to the determination of an issue before the jury constitutes misconduct in itself."<sup>27</sup>

When "determin[ing] whether the jury's exposure to [extrinsic] material resulted in prejudice to the defendant, the district court is required to objectively evaluate the effect it may have had on the jury and determine whether it would have influenced the "average hypothetical juror.""<sup>28</sup> This evaluation must include a consideration of whether or not the misconduct influenced the *offending* juror.<sup>29</sup>

In Rowbottom v. State, a juror engaged in misconduct by conducting an independent investigation, communicating with third parties about the trial and relaying her findings to the jury. The trial court found misconduct had occurred, but that prejudice had not resulted in the guilt phase because the juror did not relay any of the information until after the penalty phase had begun. However, the Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. The Court said that the juror who engaged in the misconduct "returned to and participated fully in the jury deliberations while being influenced, in whole or in part, by her... [misconduct]." In that case, the Court held that it could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt that she had not injected the opinions she developed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Maes<u>tas</u>, at \_\_\_\_, 275 P.3d at 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> <u>Barker</u>, at 312-13, 594 P.2d at 722.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Zana, at 541, 216 P.3d at 248.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> <u>Rowbottom v. State,</u> 105 Nev. 472, 486, 779 P.2d 934, 943 (1989) (overruled on other grounds, emphasis added).

<sup>30 &</sup>lt;u>Id</u>.

as a result of her misconduct into the deliberations, thereby creating prejudice to the defendant.<sup>31</sup>

In <u>Meyer</u>, the defendant alleged that two jurors committed misconduct. <sup>32</sup> The first juror read a *Physician's Desk Reference* book regarding the side effects of a certain medication and reported her findings to the jury. The Court found that "[e]ven if she had simply relied on her own memory, this would be outside information beyond the scope of the evidence. This clearly amounted to an extraneous influence upon the jury." <sup>33</sup> The second juror worked as a nurse and opined to the jury that the injuries the victim sustained were consistent with domestic violence. The Court said that her actions did not amount to misconduct because she used her everyday experiences as a nurse in reaching her opinion. However, the Court went on to say that if a juror "introduces totally new information about a fact not found in the record or evidence, this would constitute extrinsic evidence and improper conduct." <sup>34</sup>

The fact that a juror indicated that because Mr. Newcastle must be guilty because he is an inmate at Ely State prison clearly show that Mr. Newcastle was not given a fair trial by an impartial jury. Mr. Newcastle clearly suffered prejudice as a result of the misconduct in this case. Furthermore, this constituted a consideration of evidence not introduced or admitted before the jury in defiance of Jury Instruction number 4. Mr. Newcastle's prior criminal behavior, his placement in Ely State Prison, possibilities of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> <u>ld</u>.

<sup>22 | &</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> <u>Meyer</u>, at 568-69, 80 P.3d at 458.

<sup>| &</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> <u>|</u>c

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> <u>ld</u>

others involved who could have delivered splatter causing blows to the victim, and that the blood on the back of Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit was caused by a third party involved in the crime were items which were not in evidence.

Additionally, the jury engaged in guess work and speculation during deliberation in defiance of Jury Instruction number 1<sup>35</sup> when jurors speculating that Mr. Newcastle was an accomplice to the battery. It is not reasonable, from the facts in the record, for the jury to have inferred that Mr. Newcastle was an accomplice and that as a result, he is guilty of battery by an inmate with a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm.

## 2. Conflicting Evidence.

A trial court may grant a new trial based upon conflicting evidence if, after the verdict has been rendered, the judge disagrees with the jury's decision. The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon conflicting evidence is within the trial court's discretion. Such a decision will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. "Historically, Nevada has empowered the trial court in a criminal case where the evidence of guilt is conflicting, to independently evaluate the evidence and order another trial if it does not agree with the jury's conclusion that the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Conflicting evidence is distinctly different from insufficient evidence. Where there is conflicting evidence, there is evidence in the record supporting the allegations, but there is also evidence supporting an

35 (Instructions at 3.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Washington v. State, 98 Nev. 601, 604, 655 P.2d 531, 532 (1982) (citing <u>State v. Busscher</u>, 81 Nev. 587, 407 P.2d 715 (1965)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> State v. Purcell, 110 Nev. 1389, 1395, 887 P.2d 276, 280 (1994).

alternative result.<sup>38</sup> Where there is insufficient evidence, the state has failed to present evidence supporting the charges.<sup>39</sup>

In Washington v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the decision to grant a new trial based upon conflicting evidence is permissive and entirely within the trial court's discretion. 40 There, the Court delineated the difference between conflicting evidence and insufficient evidence. In dicta, it said that insufficient evidence is distinctly different from conflicting evidence because, when insufficient, there is not enough evidence to support a conviction.41

In State v. Purcell, the Nevada Supreme Court again discussed the difference between conflicting evidence and insufficient evidence. 42 In that case, the state appealed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial, arguing that the law allows a trial court unfettered discretion with which he may vacate a jury's verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed saying, "a conflict of evidence occurs where there is sufficient evidence presented at trial which, if believed, would sustain a conviction, but this evidence is contested and the district judge, in resolving the conflicting evidence differently from the jury, believes the totality of evidence fails to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."43

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<sup>38</sup> <u>Id</u>.

<sup>39</sup> <u>ld</u>.

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<sup>42</sup> 110 Nev. 1389, 887 P.2d 276.

<sup>41</sup> <u>Id</u>. (emphasis added).

<sup>40</sup> Washington, at 604, 655 P.2d at 532.

<sup>43</sup> <u>Id</u>. at 1394, 887 P.2d 278 (citing <u>State v. Walker,</u> 109 Nev. 683, 685-86, 857 P.2d 1, 2 (1993)).

Here, there is an abundance of conflicting evidence. Mr. Green's account of the events changed a number of times. His statements regarding the manner in which he allegedly escorted Mr. Newcastle from the room, the placement of the weapon, the arrival of other officers, and his account of the location and behavior of other inmates changed at least one to three times; therefore the weight they can be afforded is slight, at best. Mr. Green saw Mr. Newcastle in the room where the battery occurred. There was blood on Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit. Mr. Newcastle was later located a fair distance from the room the battery occurred. Another inmate was located close to the room of the battery. Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit had blood transfer, apparently transferred from a boot or other bloodied object. Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit had blood splatter from the victim on the front of it, indicating he was in the room when one of the blows was rendered, and that he was facing the source of the blood. In addition, however, Mr. Newcastle's jumpsuit had blood on the back of it, indicating he was in the room when one of the blows was rendered and that he was facing away from the source of the blood, thereby being nearly incapable of rendering that blow. There is no evidence or suggestion in the record that Mr. Newcastle acted in cahoots with another person.

The role of a jury is to act as a fact finder, evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence presented to them. Here, the jury deliberated and speculated for two to three hours before rendering a verdict. The evidence in this case is so conflicting, that there is sufficient cause for the Court to grant a motion for a new trial, especially in light of the misconduct outlined above.

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### Conclusion:

In this case, significant jury misconduct occurred. Jurors considered evidence not in the record including Mr. Newcastle's prior bad acts, and in essence, convicted him based upon a theory not charged, that of aiding or being an accomplice to battery. The issue of guilt or innocence in this case was too close and the jury misconduct too incredible to say definitively that the misconduct could have had no effect on a reasonable juror. As a result, the court must grant a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30 day of October, 2013.

KARIN L. KREIZENBECK, ESQ. Nevada State Public Defender

Nevada Bar No. 13036C

Deputy Nevada State Public Defender For: CHARLES H. ODGERS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8596 P.O. Box 151690 Ely, Nevada 89315

1		<u>AFFIDAVIT</u>
2	STATE OF	
3	COUNTY	) ss OF WHITE PINE )
4	СНА	RLES H. ODGERS, ESQ., being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
5	1. T	hat I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada,
6	е	employed by the Office of the Nevada State Public Defender, assigned to
7	re	epresent Mr. MIKE FIXER NEWCASTLE in the above-referenced matter;
8	2. T	hat the facts alleged in this Motion are true and correct to the best of my
9	k	nowledge as articulated in post-trial interviews of jurors, during trial, as well
10	а	s the preliminary hearing and discovery provided in this matter;
11	3. T	That I spoke with jurors Kelly Ernest, James Nelson, Josie Jensen and
12	A	Amanda Reieher and that the representations made in this motion are true
13	а	and correct as reported to me by those jurors to the best of my knowledge;
14	4. T	hat this motion is made in good faith and not for the purposes of delay; and
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# DATED this 30 day of OCTOBER, 2013. 1 KARIN L. KREIZENBECK, ESQ. 2 Nevada State Public Defender 3 CHARLES H. ODGERS, ESQ. 4 Deputy Nevada State Public Defender Nev. Bar No. 8596 5 P.O. Box 151690 Ely, Nevada 89315 6 7 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 day of October, 2013. 8 9 NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SAID 10 **GUY P. BOVARD COUNTY AND STATE NOTARY PUBLIC** STATE OF NEVADA 11 No. 13-11437-17 My Appt. Exp. July 22, 2017 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I certify that I am an employee of the Nevada State Public Defender's Office and that on this 30 day of October, 2013, I served the foregoing reply by hand-delivering a true and correct copy of the same to: Nevada State Attorney General's Office 1539 Avenue F, #2 Ely, NV 89301 AFFIRMATION Pursuant to N.R.S. § 239B.030 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, filed in this Court in STATE v. NEWCASTLE, does not contain the social security number of any person. DATED this 30 day of OCTOBER, 2013. Deputy Nevada State Public Defender